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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 5th 
District Court for Washington County, 
Hon. Robert F. Owens, District Judge Pro Tern 
Palmer and Anderson 
310 E. Tabernacle Street 
~. ~orge, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Atkin, Wright & Miles 
P.O. Box 339 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Appellant 
r= r FD 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ..................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................... 2 
ARGUMENT 
1. That the division of the property 
belonging to the parties reflects a 
punishment of the appellant for his 
marital misconduct and represents 
such a serious inequity as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion by the 
court below ............................... 7 
2. That the court below improperly 
refused to award appellant the value 
of his labor on the three personal 
residences and one half the gain 
realized on the sale of the three 
homes. Further, that the actual 
conduct of the parties demonstrates 
that a gift was made and that the 
parties considered themselves equal 
owners of their property ................. 12 
CONCLUSION ..................................••.......•. 2 3 
AUTHORITIES CIT~D 
Corleyv. Corley, 594P. 2d 1172, New Mexico, (1979) ... 13 
Ha(f§]~) ~:. ~~~~~~~'.. ~~. ~~~~. ~~. ~:: '.. :~~. ~:. ~~. ~~~ ...... 12 
Lundgren v. Lundgren, 112 Utah 31, 184 P. 2d 670 ....... 19 
~rtinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P. 2d 821 
(1958) ............................................. 7, 11 
Re ad v . Re a d , 5 9 4 p . 2 d 8 71 , Utah ( 19 7 9) . . . . . . . . . . 9 , 10 , 11 
Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956) ... 10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That the division of the property belonging 
to the parties reflects a pl.Il1ishment of the appellant for 
his marital misconduct and represents such a serious inequity 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion by the court below. 
2. That the court below improperly refused to 
award appellant the value of his labor on the three personal 
~sidences and one half the gain realized on the sale of the 
three homes. Further, that the actual conduct of the parties 
demonstrates that a gift was made and that the parties con-
sidered themselves equal owners of their property. 
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STATEMENT OF TI{E KIND OF CASE 
'This is an action for divorce by the Plaintiff 
against the Defendant where the sole issue is the equitilbll 
distribution of the marital estate. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the court Judge Robert F. 
Owens, District Judge pro tern and a Circuit Judge of the 
State of Utah presiding. Judgment of divorce from the Defe:.:· 
ant was granted to Plaintiff and a division of property and 
assets was made. Defendant appeals only the division of 
property and assets. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, WILLIAM LeROY JESPERSON, SR., seeks a 
modification of the di vision of property made by the court 
below consistent with the points raised in this appeal. ! 
! STATEMENT OF FACTS 
De fendan t-AppellJ The Plaintiff-Respondent and the 
were married to each other on March 20, 1973 in Roswell, lie• 
Mexico and no children were born as issue of the marriage 
(Tr. Pl4, LL12-18). Plain tiff is now 74 years old and Defe~ 
ant is now 79 years old (Full Disclosure Financial Declarat' 
At the time of the marriage Defendant had no asse: 
but had been a contractor and builder prior to the marriaie 
and during the marriage did a lot of work on the three res:·! 
dences of the parties (Tr. P201, LLll-22). 
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I 
! 
t\ t the ti me of the marriage P 1 ain tiff had an auto-
mobile, some furniture, $12,SOO.OO in certificates of deposit, 
and $10,000.00 in savings (Tr. P39, LL20-2S). Plaintiff also 
owned a mobile home which she had purchased for $17,SOO.OO 
cash (Tr. P38, LL4-9) on September 7, 1972 (Tr. P94 and Defend-
ant's Exhibit 4) just 6-1/2 months prior to their marriage 
on March 20, 1973. 
At the time of the divorce Plaintiff valued the 
automobile at $3,000.00 and the furniture at $2,000.00 (Plain-
tiff's Full Disclosure Financial Declaration, page 2). The 
St. George mobile home the parties owned had been sold for 
$27 ,000. 00 (Tr. Pl09, L22). After deducting closing costs 
of $1,802.67 the parties divided the net sales proceeds of 
$25,197.33 according to the trial court's findings with the 
Plaintiff receiving $23,778.lS (the first $19,027.00 plus 
77"/, of the remaining $6, 170. 33) and the Defendant receiving 
$1,419.18 (23% of the remaining $6,170.33). The Plaintiff 
was awarded the automobile and the furniture (Tr. P290, LL14-20). 
The marital estate totaled at least $30,197.33 (the automobile, 
furniture, and net proceeds of sale). Plaintiff received 
$28,778.lS, or 9S.3%, and Defendant received $1,419.18, or 4.7%. 
Plaintiff testified that her savings and certificates 
of deposit were entirely consumed during the marriage for 
moving and traveling expenses (Tr. PSS, L21) and to buy a new 
car (Tr. Pl2 3, LLlS-17) . She also testified that she kept 
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the books and paid the bills (Tr. Pll+2, Ll6). Defendant 
testified that he always recognized that this money was 
tiff's separate property and that he never asked Plainti";. 
!, ' 
any of that money (Tr. Pl92, LL7-15). Further, that he ci; 
1 
not know anything about Plaintiff's savings or certificates 
of deposit or if Plaintiff had spent all that money during ' 
i the marriage (Tr. Pl97, L25; P204, LLl-2 & P209, L6). Defrnl 
ant testified that Plaintiff could still be in possession [ 
some of that money (Tr. Pl98, L2). The trial court ruled 
that any savings or certificates of deposit still in Plaint: 
name were awarded to her in the divorce (Tr. P290,LL21-25) I 
Plaintiff testified that $1,050.00 of improvemen:: 
were added to the $17,500.00 cost of the mobile home in Ruic 
New Mexico (Tr. P44, LL6-7, 25). This home sold for $24,51 
(Tr. P92, LlS) and was sold by Mr. Jesperson (Tr. Pl74, u: 
so that there were very few closing costs (Tr. Pl55, LL6-ll, 
The Roswell, New Mexico home cost $17,500.00 (Tr. P47, Wl· 
and Plaintiff testified that $4,870.10 of improvements we:el 
made (adding up Tr. PP49-50) including a refrigerator for 
1 
$892.00 that Plaintiff still has (Tr. P261, L23). The Rosiij 
home was sold October 4, 1974, netting the parties $23,10] 
after closing costs (Tr. P98, Ll2 and Defendant's Exhibit'. 
The St. George, Utah home and lot cost $19,027.50 (Tr. Pii 
$6, 958} L24) and Plaintiff testified that improvements of 
were added (Tr. PS 3). This home was sold and netted the 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parties $25,197.33 after all closing costs. 
-
Defendant testified that he did considerable work on 
the Ruidoso home, amounting to approximately $2,120.00, in-
cluding some $220.00 for materials (Tr. PP169-174); that his 
labor on the Roswell home was worth approximately $750.00 
(Tr. PP176-180); and that his labor on the St. George home 
was worth $2,100.00 (Tr. PP183-186 and the trial court's 
Findings). A neighbor, Jesse Spencer, testified that Defend-
ant's work considerably enhanced the value of the property 
(Tr. PBS, Lll). 
At the time of the marriage Plaintiff had monthly 
income from social security of $247 .60 and monthly interest 
of $50.00 from an insurance policy (Tr. P40, LL23-25) and her 
income at the time of divorce was the same except her social 
security is now $263.90 (Tr. P54, L20). Defendant's income 
at the time of the divorce was approximately $241. 00 from 
social security (Tr. Pl98, L8). Neither the Plaintiff nor 
the Defendant were employed during the marriage. 
Plaintiff is presently living in a mobile home in 
Alpine, Texas which she purchased, making a $1,000.00 down 
payment with money "borrowed" from her daughter (Tr. P75, Ll9), 
who owns a large shopping center (Tr. P57, L9 and Pl97, 
LLB-18). Defendant is presently living in a rented apartment 
in California with his widowed daughter (Tr. Pl57, LlS and 
Pl61, Ll6). 
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Plaintiff was allowed to testify, ove D f r e endant'o 
objection (Tr. P22, LL6-16), to some eleven different r· lffib 
that Defendant left the Plaintiff. In overruling the obje,. 
tion the trial judge stated that such instances of desertion 
may have some relevance on the property division (Tr. P22 
LL17-20), which was the sole issue before the court. The 
trial judge found that: 
"Defendant was guilty of gross and repeated 
marital misconduct which not only constitutes 
grounds for divorce, but which should be con-
sidered in making an equitable division of 
property." (Findings of trial court, paragraph 2) 
The proceeds from the sale of the Ruidoso home wm' 
made payable to Mr. & Mrs. Jesperson (Tr. P95, LlO) and 
deposited in Roswell State Bank in the name of William and 
Venetta Jesperson (Tr. P96, LL2-5). 111e Roswell home was 
purchased and held in the names of both parties (Tr. Plll, 
LL2 3-25) . The improvements made on the Roswe 11 home were 
paid for through a joint checking account to which they bot"' 
made deposits as they received their monthly income (Tr. 
PP127-128). The proceeds from the sale of the Roswell home 
were deposited in a joint account at Zion's Bank in St. 
George (Tr. PlOO) . The purchase of the St. George home was 
· · · 11 k · b h · · · t t nants t\e" 1 ini ti.a y ta en in ot parties names as JOl.n e • ' , 
' i 
placed in Plaintiff's name for a period when Defendant hau J 
some financial trouble with his former 
put in both their names again on March 
LL8-24 and Defendant's Exhibit 3) . 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
Point 1. That the division of the property belonging to the 
parties reflects a plll1ishment of the Appellant for 
his marital misconduct and represents such a serious 
inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion 
by the court below. 
Defendant seeks a readjustment of the property 
division made in the decree of divorce. He does not question 
the existence of grounds nor the propriety of granting the 
divorce to the Plaintiff. Defendant claims that the disposi-
tion of the property of the parties is so inequitable and 
oojust that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion that 
should be corrected. 
Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P2d 821 
appears to recite the law in this state pertaining to the 
grounds upon which a trial court's award may be reversed or 
modified when it said, at page 822: 
We are in accord with the postulate advocated 
~y the defendant that divorce proceedings being 
in equity, this court will review the evidence and 
may substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court if circumstances warrant doing so. Neverthe-
less, it is firmly established in our law that the 
trial judge will be indulged considerable latitude 
of discretion in adjusting the financial and prop-
erty interests of the parties; conversely, however, 
if there is such serious ine uit as to manifest 
a c ear a use o iscretion, t is Court wi ma e 
the modification necessar to brin about a 'ust 
result. Exphasis Added . 
The Defendant in this case feels he can meet the 
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burden of showing such inequity. The Plaintiff received 
95. 3/. of the marital estate, not counting any savings or 
certificates of deposit which she held in her name at the t'-
of divorce. These funds were always regarded by the parties 
as her separate property even though she may have vol®tui~ ; 
consumed or used some of these funds during the marriage. 
Defendant received only 4. 71'. of their marital estate. i 
I 
The Plaintiff received the furniture which she val'-' 
at $2,000.00 and the automobile which she valued at $3,000.0! 
These valuations were made under oath by the Plaintiff in a 
"Full Disclosure Financial Declaration" required in all con-
tested divorces by order of the Fifth Judicial District Cour: 
for Washington County. Plaintiff also received $23,778.lSi: 
cash from the sale of their home in St. George pursuant to , 
the trial court's "Findings", while the Defendant received 
the balance of $1,419 .18 from the sale of the St. George 
home as his total property settlement. 
The marital estate totaled $30,197.33 and was 
distributed as follows: 
Item Value To Plain tiff To Defendant 
1. Furniture $ 2,000.00 $ 2,000.00 $ -0-
2. Automobile 3,000.00 3,000.00 -0-
3. Sale of Home 25,197.33 23,778.15 1,419.18 
Totals $30,197.33 $28,778.15 $ 1,419.18 
------
Per Cent 100% 95. 3/. 4. n 
========== =====:::::==== ==========-= 
-8-
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Defendant contends that the trial judge was 
influenced by Plaintiff's testimony concerning some eleven 
different times the Defendant left the Plaintiff and that the 
trial judge imposed a vindictive punishment in the property 
settlement upon the Defendant for his marital misconduct. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff consumed some 40-50 pages of the 
transcript questioning the parties about the times Defendant 
left Plaintiff despite an early objection by Defendant's 
counsel and an offer to stipulate to grounds for the divorce. 
In overruling Defendant's objection the trial judge stated: 
"The subject matter is relevant both to the issue 
of the grounds of divorce and there may be some 
relevance on proper division." (Tr. P22, LL17-19). 
There is no question that the trial judge con-
sidered the relative guilt of the parties in making the 
property settlement. Paragraph 2 of his "Findings" states: 
"Defendant was guilty of gross and repeated 
marital misconduct which not only constitutes 
grounds for divorce, but which should be con-
sidered in making an equitable division of property." 
The Utah Supreme Court filed its opinion in April, 
1979 in Read v. Read 594 P. 2d 871, Utah (1979), a case with 
many similarities to this case, including the same trial 
judge. In that case the Defendant husband appealed the 
trial court's award of about 90% of the assets to the Plain-
tiff wife, arguing that the award was excessive and inequitable 
and that the trial court was imposing a vindictive penalty 
upon him because he was most at fault in the breakup of the 
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marriage. In remanding the Read case for modification 
because the property award was far too disparate the Cour: 
stated: 
"It is well established that the trial court ha 
considerable discretion in the allocation oft~ 
property and financial resources of the partie/ 
Nevertheless, this discretion is not entirely · 
without limit. 
In the case be fore us it appears that the trial 
court's property award may reflect a degree of 
punishment against the defendant for his extra 
marital conduct and relative "guilt" in bringini 
about the dissolution of the marriage. A trialv 
court must consider many factors in making a 
property settlement in a divorce proceeding, but 
the purpose of the settlement should not be to 
impose punishment upon either party." 
The Court in the Read case then stated the law fr 
respect to this issue by quoting Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 
2d 79, 296 R 2d 977 (1956) as follows: 
"In regard to the defendant's contention that the 
judgment represents an effort of the court to 
impose a punishment upon him: We recognize that 
there is no authority in our law for administerin; 
punitive measures in a divorce judgment, and that 
to do so would be improper, except that the court 
may, and as a practical matter invariably does, 
consider the re la ti ve loyalty or disloyalty of thi 
parties to their marriage vows, and their relati':i 
guilt or innocence in causing the breakup of the 
marriage. It is to be recognized that it is 
seldom, perhaps never, that there is any wholly 
guilty or wholly innocent party to a divor~ 
action. The trial court was aware, of course! 
that when people are well adjusted and happy 1~" 
marriage, one of them does not just out of a/t~'.; 
blue sky fall in love with someone e~se;.an h; 
when this occurs it is usually an indication ta 
the marriage has disintegrated from other causes. 
-10-
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TI1is statement aptly applies to this case. The 
79 year old Defendant testified that he left the Plaintiff 
because of her sarcastic nature and because of family dis-
agreements that occurred on some 10 trips to Alpine, Texas 
to visit Plaintiff's family (Tr. Pl58, LLlS-22). 
In this regard the Martinett case, Supra is 
similar and instructive, as the Court, on page 822, stated: 
.. the trouble between them (the parties) has 
seemed to come largely from inability to make 
adjustments to ill health and advancing years, 
the matter of considering relative guilt or 
innocence in bringing about the divorce was 
properly considered by the trial court as minimal 
insofar as bearing on their property rights." 
The Court went on to say, on page 823, that in 
cases such as this that: 
"It is necessary to so apply the law as to do 
justice between them on the basis of a realistic 
appraisal of their circumstances and the problems 
each must confront." 
Defendant is 79, has a very small income, and finds 
it necessary to live with his widowed daughter in a rented 
apartment in California. Plain tiff is 74, also has a small 
income, but lives in a mobile home in Alpine, Texas near her 
daugher who owns a large shopping center. The Defendant 
testified that all of Plaintiff's children were "very well 
fixed financially" (Tr. Pl97, LL21-22), and his testimony 
was not disputed. The Court stated in the Read case, Supra 
that: 
-11-
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"When a marriage has failed, a court's duty is t 
consider the various factors relating to the s·t~ 
uation and to arr<lnge the best possible alloca~icn 
of the property and the economic resourcec; of th ' 
parties so that the parties . . . can pursue the~­
li ves in as happy and useful a manner as possibl" 
If it appears that the decree is so discordant w~t' 
an equitable allocation that it will more likel,, · ' 
lead to further difficulties and distress than ~o 
serve the desired objective, then a reappraisal of 
the decree must be undertaKen." 
The Defendant asks that a reappraisal of the decree 
be undertaken by the Supreme Court. In Harding v. Harding 
26 Utah 2d 277, 488 ~ 2d 308 (1971) the Court said: 
"it is the prerogative of this court to review 
the evidence, to make its own findings, and to 
substitute its judgment for that of the triial 
court when the ends of justice so require." 
There is no need to remand this case to the trial 
court for additional evidence. To do so would impose a 
hardship upon the parties who now reside in Texas and Cali-
fornia. The Supreme Court should review the evidence and 
make an adjustment so that the parties can adjust their 
lives in a happy and useful manner. 
Point 2. That the court below improperly refused to award 
Appellant the value of his labor on the three 
personal residences and one half the gain realizeG 
on the sale of the three homes. Further, that the 
actual conduct of the parties demonstrates that' 
gift was made and that the parties considered 
themselves equal owners of their property. 
-12-
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The trial court found that the reasonable value 
of Defendant's labor on the St. George home was $2,100.00 
(paragraph 4 of the trial court's Findings), but failed to 
make any findings as to what the reasonable value of Defendant's 
labor on the Ruidoso and Roswell homes in New Mexico might 
be despite considerable testimony on the subject. 
In Corley v. Corley 594 E 2d, 1172, a 1979 New 
Mexico divorce case where all the property was the husband's 
separate property, the New Mexico Supreme Court found, on 
page 1174, that: 
"Mrs. Corley contributed her labor and talents 
to the improvements on the 33.185 acres con-
sisting of a three-bedroom house, a barn and an 
old milk barn remodeled into a guest house." 
The Court then held: 
"that the community contributed labor and talent 
to the benefit of Carley's separate property. 
Mrs. Corley should be given credit for the value 
of her share of those contributions." 
The trial court erred in not recognizing the 
value of Defendant's work on the New Mexico homes. It is 
hard to understand how the trial court could make a finding 
on the value of Defendant's labor on the St. George home and 
ignor his work on the New Mexico homes. If the trial court 
had recognized the Defendant's labor on the New Mexico homes, 
it would not have folild that the $19, 02 7. 50 purchase of the 
St. George home all came from Plaintiff's separate flilds but 
would have realized that the money brought to Utah and used 
to purchase the St. George home was already charged with 
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the value of Defendant's labor on the New Mexico homes 
Defendant testified that he did considerable work 
on the Ruidoso home, amoun tint; to approximately $2, 120 oo 
including some $220.00 for materials (Tr. PP 169-174). A 
breakdown of Defendant's testimony from page 169 to page 11 ~ 
of the transcript shows that he did the following work and 
assigned the following values to his work: 
1. Leveling the lot, which was "on 
a sloping ridge in the mountains" 
and had "big mounds of dirt and 
rocks" (Tr. Pl65, LL16-18). 
2. Trim deadwood out of several 
pine, oak, and juniper trees. 
3. Built and painted a three foot 
fence arolll1d the lot. 
Materials 
Labor ($100.00 to $150.00) 
4. Enclosing, paneling, and 
pain ting area lll1der back porch. 
Materials 
Labor 
5. Landscaping, planting flowers, 
shrubs, vines, and lawn and digging 
ditch to prevent runoff water 
damage to the lot. 
Total 
$ 500.0Q 
200.00 
120. OG 
use 100 .O~ 
lOU I 
100 .0~1 
~ 
$2 ,120.0U 
:;::::;:::::::::::==:;:: 
Defendant's labor must have been worth in excess 
of this arnolll1t in view of the fact that the home was sold 
a few months after the marriage for $24,500.00 for a ~ain 
of $3,830.00 after deducting Defendant's labor as follows 
-14-
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Sales Price (Tr. P92, Ll5) 
Less: Closing Cos ts (Tr. Pl55, LL6-11 
and Pl 74, L22) 
Proceeds Received 
Less: Original Cost (Tr. P38, LL4-9) $17,500.00 
Improvements - Plaintiff's 
Testimony (Tr. P44, LL6-7, 25) 
Defendant's Labor & Materials 
(Tr. PP169-174 and as shown 
above) 
Total Cost 
Profit On Sale 
1,050.00 
2,120.00 
$24,500.00 
NONE 
$24,500.00 
20,670.00 
$ 3,830.00 
This is a significant profit for a mobile home, 
especially in view of the fact that the home was purchased 
September 7, 1972 (Defendant's Exhibit 4) six months prior 
to the marriage and sold within a year's time (Tr. P214, L7). 
Defendant also testified that he did work on the 
Roswell home amounting to approximately $750.00. A break-
down of Defendant's testimony from page 176 to page 180 of 
the transcript shows that he did the following work and 
assigned the following values to his work: 
l. Rebuilt six foot picket fence 
around large lot. 
2. Repair tool shed. 
3. Cut down and dug up stumps 
of five tall poplar trees 
(about 25 hours x $6.00) 
4. Level front yard, reseed the 
lawn, plant flowers 
5. Paint eaves, windows and doors 
Total 
-15-
$ 300.00 
100. 00 
150.00 
200.00 
? 
$ 750.00 
========== 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again, the parties made a profit of $877.79 in 
about a year's time when they sold this home on October 4, 
1974 (Defendant's Exhibit 5) even after deducting the impro 
ments and Defendant's labor as shown below: 
Sales Price (Defendant's Exhibit 5) 
Less: Closing Costs (Defendant's Exhibit 5) 
Proceeds Received (Defendant's Exhibit 5) 
Less: Original Cost (Tr. P47, 
LL24-25) 
Improvements - Plaintiff's 
$17 ,500.00 
Testimony (Tr. PP49-50) 4,870.10 
Add Back Refrigerator Plain-
tiff Still Has (Tr. P261, L23) (892.00) 
Defendant's Labor (Tr. PP 
176-180 and as shown above) 750.00 
$25,000.0G 
1, 894' l'. 
$23,105.39 
Total Cost 22,228.ln 
Pro fit On Sale $ 877. 79 
The parties lost $2,888.56 on the St. George horr.e 
after deducting the improvements and Defendant's labor, pre· 
bably because both of them had left Utah and accepted a 
price below fair market value. Their loss is computed belN 
Sales Price (Tr. Pl09, L22) $27,000.00 
Less: Closing Costs 1,802.6) 
Proceeds Received $25, 197.JJ 
Less: Original Cost (Tr. PlOl, L24)$19,027.50 
Improvements - Plaintiff's 
Testimony (Tr. P53) 
Defendant's Labor (Trial 
Court's Findings) 
Total Cost 
Loss On Sale 
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6,958.39 
28 085 3~ ~,
($ 2,858.561 
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Defendant's labor on all three homes totals 
$4,970.00 as follows: 
Ruidoso home (see above) 
Roswell home (see above) 
St. George home (see 
trial court's Findings) 
Total Labor 
$2,120.00 
7SO.OO 
2,100.00 
$4,970.00 
The parties realized an overall profit of 
$1, 819. 23 on all three homes after deducting the improvements 
and after deducting Defendant's labor as follows: 
Ruidoso home (see above) 
Roswell home (see above) 
St. George home (see above) 
Overall Profit 
$3,830.00 
8 77. 79 
(2,888.S6) 
$1,819.23 
With an overall profit it is obvious that the 
parties did not need to take any money out of Plaiintiff' s 
separate funds in order to 1:.uy or improve any of these homes. 
Any of Plaintiff's separate ftmds used in the marriage must 
have been used for traveling, moving, or living expenses 
and would have to be considered voltmtary contributions to 
the commtmity. Plaintiff testified that they were used for 
moving and traveling (Tr. PSS, L21). They certainly should 
not be charged against the Defendant who always regarded 
those funds as Plaintiff's separate property (Tr. Pl92, 
LL?-15) and who did not and does not know whether Plaintiff 
used that money during the marriage (Tr. Pl97, L2S) or whether 
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Plaintiff still has those funds (Tr. Pl98, L2). It shou\, 
be remembered that Plaintiff kept the books and paid the 
during the marriage (Tr. Pl42, Ll6) and that this infor;,,,· 
was exclusively within her knowledge. In this situation. 
would be just as wrong to conclude that Plaintiff useri ne: 
separate f1.ll1ds to make these improve men ts as it would be: 
conclude that Defendant is entitled to credit for one-haL 
the improvements simply because the improvements were pc 
for out of f1.ll1ds held in joint checking accounts to which 
both parties deposited their social security income (Tr. .. 
12 7-128). 
If one were to mathematically attempt to reduce' 
Defendant's award to the minimum and still maintain some 1 
semblance of an equitable and logical approach, one would 
recognize that Plaintiff made the · · · 1 h · h' I i.ni.ti.a pure ase wit. .1e: 1 
separate funds, that improvements .I were paid for out of pro:.! 
from the previous sale, and that Defend<lnt is entitled to 
credit for the value of the labor and talent he contribute! 
to the improvement of the properties. The overall profit 
$1,819.23 would be divided equally between the parties. 
Defendant would receive $5,879.61 and Plaintiff the balar.CI 
as follows: 
Defendant's labor on all 
three homes (see above) 
Defendant's one-half share 
of overall profit on all 
three homes 
Total To Defendant 
-18-
$4 '9 70. 00 
909.61 
$5,879.61 
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This approach could be considered a refinement 
of Lhe method used in Lundgren v. Lundgren 112 Utah 31, 184 
P. 2d 670 where the husband had paid for the property and the 
wife had done considerable work making improvements and the 
court awarded the wife one-half the excess of the market 
value over the husband's original cost. The court in the 
Lundgren case probably did not have the advantage of knowing 
the cost of the improvements or the reasonable value of the 
labor as it does in this case. Where such evidence is in the 
record the court should recognize both the cost of the 
improvements and the reasonable value of the labor before 
dividing the overall profit equally between the parties. 
Applying this method to this case shows that Defend-
ant is entitled to an award of $5,879.61, or an additional 
$4,460.43 over the $1,419.18 he has already received. Even 
so, Defendant's total property award would only come to 
19.5% of the marital estate of $30,197.33. When a court 
of equity considers the age of the Defendant (79), the 
manner in which the parties handled the proceeds from each 
sale and took title on their next purchase (always in joint 
bank accounts or in joint tenancy - see last paragraph of 
the STATEMENT OF FACTS), and the present living situation 
of the parties (Defendant in an apartment with his widowed 
daughter and Plaintiff in her own mobile home near her 
daughter who owns a large shopping mall), it may well be 
that Defendant should have a settlement far in excess of 
$6,000 OrJ. 
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Several days before the trial Defendont filed a 
"Memorandum" with the trial court and mailed a copy to 
Plaintiff's attorney. The Memorandum set forth the facts 
and then Pre sented a "Gift Th " f th 1 eory or e reso ution of th'.: 
case, citing some 18 cases, 14 cases from 10 different corr;:.or 
law states and 4 cases from 2 different community propen:.r 
states, showing that a gift results in those states when a 
conveyance is taken in the name of the husband ond wife by 
the wife's consent and direction, notwithstanding the wife 
pays all the consideration. At the trial it was evi~nt 
from Plaintiff's testimony that she had been advised of thi' 
argument and that she was prepared to refute it, possibly 
even to the extent of perjury. On direct examination Plain· 
tiff claimed she deposited the proceeds from the Ruidoso sai': 
to her savings account which did not have Defendant's name 
on it (Tr. P49, L9), but on cross-examination Plaintiff 
admitted that the proceeds were deposited in Roswell State 
Bank in the names of William & Veneta Jesperson (Tr. P96, 
LL2-5). Again, Plaintiff testified on direct examination 
that the improvements to the Roswell home were paidoutofl 
her own savings (Tr. PSO, L24), but on cross-examination 
Plaintiff reluctantly admitted that the improvements were 
paid from a joint checking account (Tr. Pl27, L23). Again 
<· 
on direct examination Plaintiff testified that the proceec: 
f d · d · her savings (Tr rom the Roswell sale were eposite into 
h tool: P52, L25), but on cross-examination admitted that 5 e 
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the check with them to California, then to Utah, where she 
deposited it in a joint account at Zions Bank (Tr. PlOO, 
119-15). Again, on direct examination Plaintiff testified 
that the improvements to the St. George home were paid out 
of her own savings account (Tr. P54, LS), but on cross-exam-
ination admitted that the improvements were paid from a 
joint account (Tr. Pl36, LL3, 8-13). 
When the Plaintiff finally admitted that the pro-
ceeds of each sale were put in their joint names and that 
the title of each home was taken in their joint names, she 
then began to claim that it was done under pressure (Tr. 
Pll3, LL9-17) and that pressure was exerted upon her almost 
from the beginning of the marriage (Tr. Pll5, LL20-24). This 
is entirely inconsistent with the fact that Plaintiff kept 
the books, paid the bills, and opened the accounts (Tr. 
Pl42, LL13-23). It is also inconsistent with the fact that 
Plaintiff has operated a business and owned property in other 
places (Tr. Pll7, LL16-20) and inconsistent with the fact 
that, by her own testimony, she had always had an attorney 
take care of her properties and yet did not consult an 
attorney on any of these transactions (Tr. Pll7, L25 & Pll8, 
LLl-9). It is also inconsistent with Defendant's testimony 
that Plaintiff cannot be forced to do anything she doesn't 
want to do (Tr. Pl91, LLl0-12). Certainly, if she was being 
pressured to do something against her own desires she would 
have been concerned enough to take some corrective action. 
-21-
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In a situation of this kind where both part' les ca;, 
make self-serving statements concerning their intentio , 
ns 'nt 
best evidence of intention is what the parties actually did. 
In this case, despite Plaintiff's reluctance to admit what 
they actually did, the record is clear that: 
1. The proceeds from the sale of the Ruidoso horr.e 
were made payable to both parties (Tr. P95, LlO); 
2. The Ruidoso proceeds were deposited in Roswell, 
State Bank in the name of William and Venetta Jesperson 
(Tr. P96, LL2-5); 
3. The Roswell home was purchased and held in 
the names of both parties (Tr. Plll, LL21-25); 
4. The improvements made on the Roswell home were. 
paid for through a joint checking account to which they both 
made deposits of their monthly income (Tr. PP127-128); 
5. The proceeds from the sale of the Roswell 
home were deposited in a joint account at Zions Bank (·Tr. 
PlOO, LL9-15 and Pl81, LL22-25); 
6. The St. George home was initally taken in the 
name of both parties as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship (Tr. Pll2, LL8-13 and Defendant's Exhibit 6); 
7. · Plair The St. George home was placed solely in ·· 
tiff's name when Defendant had some financial trouble with 
his former wife but that it was again placed in both their 
. h ·p whee· 
names as joint tenants with full righs of survivors 1 
-22-
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Defendant's financial trouble was over (Tr. Pll2, L24 and 
Defendant's Exhibit 3); and 
8. The improvements made on the St. George home 
were paid for through a joint account (Tr. Pl36, LL3, 8-13 
and Pl86, LL7-13). 
With eight transactions to illustrate the parties 
intention it is doubtful that any kind of testimony to the 
contrary could overcome the presumption of a gift and con-
sequent equal ownership, which presumption must be rebutted 
by clear and convincing evidence or evidence showing fraud, 
mistake, or undue influence. Defendant's Memorandum on this 
point and which is in the record on appeal recites 18 cases 
from 12 different states supporting this common law doctrine 
and additional supporting cases may be found at 43 ALR 2d 
917. Although no Utah cases are included in the annotation, 
Defendant believes that this doctrine should be extended 
to include Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant and Appellant respectfully submits that 
the award of over 95% of the marital estate to the Plaintiff 
and Respondent is so inequitable that it manifests an abuse 
of even that wide latitude of discretion afforded the trial 
court and that this Court should modify the property division 
to allow the parties to adjust their lives in a happy and use-
ful manner. 
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The court should not attempt to penalize one of 
the partners in a marriage which has apparently broken do· .. ':i 
by making what, on its very face, is a punitive, vindictive 
and inequitable distribution of the marital estate. 
At the very least Defendant should be allowed to 
recover the reasonable value of his labor and talents expen(, 
on improving and making three homes more livable, more attrii· 
tive, and certainly more valuable, together with his share 
of the overall profit realized on the sale of the three horr.,, 
Defendant's age, present living situation, andthe 
evidence showing how the parties have held, improved, and 
sold their real property shows that Defendant, in equitv, ;, 
either entitled to an increased award over and above the va:. 
of his labor and share of profits or that he is entitled to 
one half the proceeds on the sale of the St. George home 
because a gift, which was not adequately rebutted, was made 
to the Defendant as shown by the actual conduct of the pare. 
DATED this ~day of September, 1979. 
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JdHNLYON MILES . I 
Attorney for Defendant-AP?' 
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